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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case poses an interesting question with regards to credit life insurance. Namely, what 
is the effect of an insurer's failure to issue coverage prior to an applicant's death where 1) Idaho 
law requires that coverage begin on the date of the indebtedness being insured, 2) the applicant 
died after the indebtedness but before a policy issued, and 3) there is no evidence that the 
applicant would not have qualified for the coverage had the company timely processed the 
application? 
This case involves a claim for credit life insurance benefits. Plaintiff and his wife sought 
credit life insurance in conjunction with a $57,200.48 real estate loan in 2008. The insurance was 
to begin on the date the loan closed. Plaintiff's wife died unexpectedly five days after the closing 
of the loan. When a claim was filed for benefits, the credit life insurance company denied the 
claim stating that no contract existed as they had not yet "completed underwriting" for Plaintiff's 
wife prior to her death. There is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff's wife would not have 
qualified for the coverage. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Plaintiff filed his case on June 8,2010. (R Vol. 1, pp. 5-11.) Mr. Shapley alleged 
breach of contract, bad faith, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud 
and misrepresentation. The fraud claim was based on the conduct of Defendant Ellison however 
the parties stipulated to Ellison's dismissal on July 20, 2011, which effectively dismissed that 
count. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on July 21, 2011. (R Vol. 2, pp. 
232-234.) The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on November 4,2011. (R Vol. 2, pp. 277-284.) Final judgment was entered 
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on November 28, 2011. (R Vol. 2, pp. 302-304.) 
The Plaintifftimely sought reconsideration of the District Court's decision pursuant to 
Rule 11 (a)(2). (R Vol. 2, pp. 305-307.) Plaintiff also sought to amend his Complaint to add a 
count for estoppel on November 23,2011. (R Vol. 2, pp. 285-301.) 
The District Court denied the requested amendment and reconsideration. Specifically, 
summary judgment on all of Plaintiff s claims was granted holding that no contract of insurance 
had been in existence between the parties at the time of Barbara Shapley's death. (R Vol. 2, p. 
283.) 
C. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
When Barbara Shapley died of a massive brain hemorrhage on July 15,2008, she had 
been married to her husband William (Bill) for 42 years. (R Vol. 1, p. 172) After 30 years spent 
raising their two children, the Shapleys moved from Ypsilanti, Michigan, to Homedale, Idaho, in 
1996. (Jd.) They started out living in a small trailer home on property they owned. (Jd.) In the 
summer of2008 they decided to obtain a loan to help them build a house. (Jd.) The Shapleys went 
to Wells Fargo Financial (Wells Fargo) in Nampa to see about financing in June 2008 where they 
met with Steve Ellison, an employee of Wells Fargo. (ld.) The Shapleys ultimately obtained a real 
estate loan for $57,200.48. Between June 20, 2008, and July 10, 2008, the Shapleys provided 
information and documentation to Wells Fargo in suppOli of their loan application. (R Vol. 1 , pp. 
172-173) 
From the very first time that financing was discussed in June, the Shapleys also discussed 
credit insurance on the loan with people at Wells Fargo. (Jd.) Steve Ellison testified that credit life 
insurance was discussed on the Shapleys' first visit to the branch. 
Q. Do you remember the first time you met Bill Shapley or his wife? 
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A Yes. 
Q Tell me about it. 
A. They came into Wells Fargo Financial, spoke with Kyle first requesting a 
Loan, and Kyle directed them to me. He gave introductions. And the first 
question Bill asked was along the lines of, is there insurance on your 
loans? Or, can I get insurance? 
Q. That was the first question he asked you? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And what did you tell him? 
A. I said we have those options. 
Q. Do you remember giving him options? 
A. Yes. 
(R VoU, pp. 60-61) 
On July 10, 2008, William and Barbara Shapley closed on their loan. (R Vol. 1, p. 102) 
The Shapleys provided the necessary information to apply for credit life insurance on their loan to 
be issued through Centurion Life Insurance Company. (R Vol. 1, p. 110; also R Vol. 1, pp. 172-
173) Despite providing information relative to the loan for much of the month preceding the 
closing ofthe real estate loan, Wells Fargo didn't have the Shapleys fill out the applications for 
credit life insurance until the date of closing on the loan. 
The insurance had a "proposed effective date of July 10, 2008." (R Vol. 1, p. 110) The 
document states: "The Term of Insurance starts on the Proposed Effective Date shown above." (R 
Vol. 1, p. 111) The application materials also contained a "Health Statement" which lists several 
health-related questions for Bill and Barbara to answer. (R Vol.1, p. 112.) Barbara's answers 
were all negative, as in not having any prior history of any of the listed medical problems. (R Vol. 
1, p. 112) Bill Shapley indicated a prior history of gout. (fd.) The "Health Statement" also 
includes the following promissory language: 
"I (We) have read this Insurance Disclosure and Application and received a copy 
of it. I (We) want the coverage indicated in the schedule and agree to pay the cost 
of this insurance. If my (our) application is approved, I (we) will be sent a 
certificate of insurance in approximately 30 days." 
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(R Vol. 1, p. 112.) 
Sadly, on July 11, 2008 only one day after signing for the loan to build their new home, 
Barbara Shapley suffered a cerebral hemorrhage. She was hospitalized and passed away on July 
15, 2008. (R Vol. 1, p. 117) 
After Barbara's death, William Shapley talked to Steve Ellison. Mr. Ellison told Mr. 
Shapley that the credit life insurance began on the date the loan closed and instructed Mr. Shapley 
to submit a claim. (R Vol. 1, p.I72) Mr. Shapley submitted a claim to Centurian on July 17, 2010. 
(R Vol. 1, p. 173) After receiving the claim, Centurion instructed Interviews by Underwriters 
(IBU), to conduct a telephone interview with William Shapley regarding his medical history. (R 
Vol. 1, p. 128) IBU is a third party company utilized by Centurion to complete its underwriting 
interviews. (R Vol. 1, p. 127) 
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Health Statement 
Applicant:, Gender f><J M [ 1 F 
i!~ J/ 
Height~ft. ~in. Weight~lbs. Date of Birth; Mo. Day r.  
Have you used tobacco or nicotine in any form during the past 12 months? [ J Yes f>Ll No 
Co-Applicant: Gender [ } M [ @ 
Height~ft. _Lin. Weight -LS:Q.lbs. Date of Birth: Mo. ay  Yr.  
Have you used tobacco or nicotine in any form during the past 12 months? [ 1 Yes [~ 
Please answer the foUowing questions regarding your health: 
In the past five years have you been told that you had; been treated or had medical tests ror; or received medical 
advice for: high blood pressure, chest pain, stroke, or disease of the heart or blood vessels; cancer or tumor of 
any kind; epilepsy, mental or nervous disorder; diabetes; lung or respiratory disorder; liver, gastric or intestinal 
disorder; hepatitis; kidney or urinary tract disorder; disorder of the blood or lymph nodes; neurological or 
neuromuscular disorder; or any disease of the reproductive orgGlllt;, h 1<;luuh 1\:1 1I1~ UltldStS? 
Applicant: [ ) Yes t>1 No Co-Applicant: [1 Yes [t{~ 
, 
Have you ever been treated for or told by a physician thai you had Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, AIDS 
Related Complex, or a positive test for HTLV·III virus? 
Applicant: [ ) Yes f<J No Co-Applicant: [1 Yes [>q No 
In the past five years have you had or been treated for arthritis.~urSitiS, rheumatiS~, sciatica; or for injury, 
pain or disorder of the neck, back or joints? 
Applicant: 1)4. Yes [J No Co-Applicant: [J Yes 111 No 
In the past five years have you had or been treated for a disabling injUry or condition, or are you now disabled or 
not able to work at your usual occupation for any reason? 
Applicant: (jYes btl No Co-Applicant: [J Yes ~ No 
I (We) understand that this Health Slatement is part of the Insurance Disclosure and Application and that the 
answers to these questions will be used to determine my (our) eligibility for the insurance requested. I (We) 
authorize any licensed physician, medical practitioner, hospital, clinic or other medical or medically related facility, 
insurance company, the Medical Information Bureau or other organization, institution, any consumer reporting 
agency or person having records or knowledge of me (us) or my (our) health to give the Centurion Life Insurance 
Company such information. This authorization will be valid for 30 months from the date of signature. You (or your 
aUlhorized representative) are entitled to receive a copy of this authorization. A photocopy of this authorization is 
as valid as the original. 
The answers to the questions above are true and cOlTlpleteto the best of my knowledge. Untruthful answers may 
result in denial of coverage or claims. 
I (We) have read this Insurance Disclosure and Application and received a copy of it. I r;Ne) want the coverage 
indicated. in the Schedule and agree to pay the cost of Ihisinsurance.lfmy(our).application is approved, .1. (we) 
will be sent a certificate of insurance in approximately 30 days. 
Signature of APplic~nt;::h2~":: ~DJ..""'·,?9····""fy7'··~",,7:........ ____ [)~fe~/o~Orr 
.~ignatureofCq;8Pplicaflt::... •  ·~;;uJ.::uJ¥Jf..~~"r.../:.~.pd:;';=~....,-,'-~ Date: 7' /0-, 02: 
"Health Statement" R. Vol. 1, pg. 112 
After Barbara Shapley's death and claim for benefits, Centurion sent a letter to Mr. 
Shapley dated july 17,2008, stating: 
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"We were very sorry to learn of the death of Mrs. Shapley. Please accept our 
condolences. Because we were not able to complete underwriting for Mrs. 
Shapley we have approved credit life insurance for you only." 
(R Vol. 1, p. 142.) 
Ultimately the Defendants issued coverage on the loan, but limited it to the life of Bill 
Shapley. The same July 17th letter from Defendants included a certificate of insurance issued for 
William Shapley only with a new effective date of July 17,2008. (Jd.) 
The only reason given in the record Centurion did not approve coverage was that it had 
not completed the phone interview. (R Vol. 1, p. 128) 
Q. And the reason for not insuring Mrs. Shapley is that it says, "We were not 
able to complete underwriting for Mr. Shapley"; is that con-ect? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was missing? 
A. The interview. 
Q. The interview, okay. Is that it? 
A. Yes. 
Centurion stated that had it completed the phone interview of Barbara Shapley, her insurance 
would have been approved. (R Vol. 1, p. 126) 
Q. Ultimately, Centurion approved Mr. Shapley? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Issued credit life for his loan? 
A. A single, yes. 
Q. When you looked at your underwriting file this morning and you had the 
documents there for Mr. and Mrs. Shapley, there was no indication that, 
had she not passed away, Mrs. Shapley would have been approved? 
A. No. 
The purpose for the telephone "interview" by Centurion was to ask the same questions 
answered on the "Health Statement" form filed. (R Vol. 1, p. 127) Nancy Lunn, Centurion's 
Claim's Manager and Underwriting Manager, stated "they would call the applicant then and ask 
the questions but drill down -- you know, if they get a yes answer, then they will drill down, you 
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know, what medication do you take, you know, things like that." (R Vol. 1, p. 127) The interview 
is solely a creation of Wells' and Centurion's internal policies and is not required by any laws or 
regulations. In fact, the verbal interview is contrary to the insurance regulations of this state 
governing Credit Life Insurance. Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, 18.01.61.11.14 ("No 
statement made by a debtor shall be used by the insurer as a basis for denying eligibility for 
coverage unless such a statement is contained in a written application for insurance signed by the 
debtor.). 
Finally, it should not be lost on this Court that at the time the Shapleys were seeking credit 
insurance from Centurion Life Insurance Company through an agent working also as a loan 
officer for Wells Fargo Financial, it was an entity wholly-owned by Wells Fargo Financial. In 
fact, all Centurion Life employees were Wells Fargo employees. (R Vol. 1, p. 120, LL. 7-10) As 
a business in 2008 and 2009, Wells Fargo Financial offered real estate loans, substantially all of 
which were secured debt consolidation loans, and both prime and nonprime auto secured loans, 
unsecured loans and credit cards. (See, https:/lwww.wellsfargo.com/downloads/pdflinvest_ 
relations/wf2009annualreport.pdf at p.59) 
In its Annual Report for 2009, Wells Fargo represented that Wells Fargo Financial had 
"$25.8 billion and $29.1 billion in real estate secured loans at December 31,2009, and 2008, 
respectively" and "$16.5 billion and $23.6 billion in auto secured loans and leases at December 
31,2009, and 2008, respectively" and "$8.1 billion and $8.4 billion in unsecured loans and credit 
card receivables at December 31,2009, and 2008, respectively." (Id.) The designee for Centurion 
Life Insurance Company (a Wells Fargo Financial employee) testified under oath that 40% of 
eligible loans sold by Wells Fargo have credit insurance attached. (R VoU, pp.122-123.) 
To date, Centurion and Wells have not made any payment on the claim for Barbara 
7 
Shapley's death. In fact, it states it would handle this claim exactly the same way ifit were to 
happen again. Jd at 45:14-16. 
Q. If it happened again today, it would be handled the exact same way? 
A. Yes. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether or not the District Court erred in granting Defendants' combined Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the basis that no contract of insurance existed. 
2. Whether or not the District Court erred in denying Plaintiffs motion to amend to include 
a count for equitable estoppel. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FINDING THAT NO CONTRACT OF 
INSURANCE HAD ISSUED TO BARBARA SHAPLEY. 
A. The standard of review is de novo. 
"When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard of 
review used by the district court in ruling on the motion." Security Financial Fund, LLC v. 
Thomason, 282 P.3d 604 (Idaho ,20 12); citing Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 
437,441,235 P.3d 387, 391 (2010). A grant of summary judgment is only warranted where "the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
The moving party bears the burden of proving the absence of an issue as to any material 
fact. Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577, 97 P.3d 439, 444 (2004). The facts must be 
liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. Renzo v. Idaho State Dep't of Agric., 149 
Idaho 777, 779,241 P.3d 950, 952 (2010). At summary judgment, "[t]he issue is not whether the 
plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the 
claims." Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561,563 (1995) (quoting 
Greenfield v. Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 698, 701 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
B. As sellers of insurance, Defendants are obligated to act honestly and 
equitably. 
"The business of insurance is one affected by the public interest, requiring that all persons 
be actuated by good faith, abstain from deception, and practice honesty and equity in all 
insurance matters. Upon the insurer, the insured, and their representatives, and all concerned in 
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insurance transactions, rests the duty of preserving the integrity of insurance." I.C. § 41-113. 
Indeed, insurance as a business is intertwined with life in modern society. Many kinds of 
insurance are required and the myriad of different types of insurance and coverages have led 
states to adopt rules peculiar to the insurance industry. 
1. Credit Life insurance can only be offered ifit complies with state laws 
and regulations 
State regulation of insurance policy terms and rates has been in existence for decades. 
State insurance regulators created the National Association ofInsurance Commissioners! (NAIC) 
in 1871 to address the need to coordinate regulation of multi state insurers. (See, 
http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm.) The first major step in that process was the development 
of uniform financial reporting by insurance companies. One often cited justification is that heavy 
regulation is necessary because joint insurance company activities in developing standard policy 
terms and rates are exempt from federal antitrust laws. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-13. Courts in 
Idaho have long-recognized that the relationship between insured and insurer is characterized by 
public policy concerns. See generally, White v. Uniguard, 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986). 
Credit life insurance is a particularly peculiar insurance product. It is generally defined as 
insurance issued to a creditor (lender) to cover the life of a debtor (borrower) for an outstanding 
loan. (http://www.naic.org/consumer_glossary.htm) In this case, the "creditor policyholder" was 
"Wells Fargo Financial Idaho, Inc." (R VoU, p. 110.) Bill and Barbara Shapley were the 
Headquartered in Kansas City, Mo., the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) is a 
voluntary organization of the chief insurance regulatory officials of the 50 states, the District of Columbia and 
five U.S. territories. The NAIC's overriding objective is to assist state insurance regulators in protecting 
consumers and helping maintain the financial stability of the insurance industry by offering financial, 
actuarial, legal, computer, research, market conduct and economic expertise. Formed in 1871, the NAIC is the 
olaest association of state officials. For more than 135 years, state-based insurance supervision has served the 
needs of consumers, industry and the business of insurance at-large by ensuring hands-on, frontline 
protection for consumers, while providing insurers the uniform platforms and coordinated systems they need 
to compete effectively in an ever-changing marketplace. 
11 
debtors. (ld.) "The whole purpose of credit life insurance is to provide funds to payoff a 
specified debt of the insured ifhe should die while the debt is outstanding." Klepper v. Standard 
Life Ins. Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d 470,472,131 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (Ct. App. 1976). Credit life 
insurance is treated very differently than other types of insurance and specially regulated. Idaho 
Code 41-2301, et. seq. In a credit life transaction, the issuance of the policy is closely intertwined 
with the credit transaction. 
Credit life insurance has been recognized to be something different than the 
normal policy of life insurance. Generally, a policy of life insurance is a stand-
alone contract whose purpose is to provide a sum of money to the named 
beneficiary upon the death of the listed insured. A credit life insurance policy, on 
the other hand, is an integral part of a financial transaction involving a loan, 
consumer financing arrangement, or other form of credit obligation, with 
repayment of the anticipated obligation typically extending over a number of 
months or years. As a part of the transaction, a policy of life insurance is 
arranged on the life of the debtor with the creditor named as beneficiary. The 
purpose of the policy is to retire the balance of a debt should the debtor die 
prior to the end of the contemplated repayment period. 
Agnew v. Washington Mut. Fin. Group, LLC., 244 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 (N.D. Miss. 2003) 
(emphasis added). "The issuance of a policy is part of the credit transaction with the only purpose 
being the protection of the loan amount during the repayment period." Id. 
Often, as is the case here, the insurer is part of the same institution as the creditor and the 
premiums for the policy are charged monthly concurrent and as part of the loan repayment. (R. 
YoU, pg. 110-112.) Idaho has adopted the various uniform acts and regulations promulgated by 
the NAIC regarding credit life and credit disability insurance. IDAPA 18.01.61 Credit Life and 
Disability Insurance governs multiple aspects of offering this type of insurance in Idaho. For 
instance, the Regulation at 012, 013, and 014 governs policy forms, determination of reasonable 
"loss ratios", and "prima facie rates" that can be charged by a company. There is really no 
comparison between credit life insurance and other, more typical, types of life insurance and this 
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should be taken into consideration by the Court. 
I. Idaho Code §41-2307 requires that the term of credit life 
insurance offered in Idaho begin on the date of the 
indebtedness. 
Idaho Code 41-2301, et. seq., contains the statutory regulation of credit life insurance. 
Section 41-2307 requires that credit life insurance begin on the date the indebtedness is incurred 
unless proof of insurability is required and that proof is issued more than thirty days following 
the application. "The term of any credit life insurance or credit disability insurance shall, subject 
to acceptance by the insurer, commence on tlte date wlten the debtor becomes obligated to the 
creditor . .. " (Idaho Code §41-2307)(emphasis added). The statute allows for a later effective date 
only if evidence of insurability is to be provided thirty days after the indebtedness begins. Id. 
Such statutory provisions are as much a part of the credit disability insurance policy as though 
they were written therein. First Sec. Bank of Bozeman v. Goddard, 181 Mont. 407,413-14,593 
P.2d 1040, 1044 (1979). 
The requirement that the term of the policy begin at the time the indebtedness begins 
coincides with the requirement that the insurer provide the insured with a certificate of insurance 
at the time of closing on the loan. "The individual policy or group certificate of insurance shall be 
delivered to the insured debtor at the time the indebtedness is incurred except as hereinafter 
provided." (Idaho Code § 41-2308 (3)) Therefore, the certificate should have been provided to 
the Shapleys at closing. 
ii. Idaho credit insurance regulations limit the evidence a 
company may use to determine eligibility to written 
applications signed by the insured. 
The Defendants had a legal obligation to commence the policy coverage on July 10,2008, 
as long as Barbara Shapley met their underwriting guidelines based on the information provided 
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in the "Health Statement." It is undisputed in this case that the only reason for not issuing the 
insurance for Barbara Shapley was that Centurion did not complete a "phone interview." (R. Vol. 
1, pg. 128) There is evidence in the record that Barbara Shapley otherwise qualified for the 
insurance and, had the interview been conducted, it would have been issued. (R VoU, pp. 126) 
The "interview" process is explained to the insured in the "Notice ofInsurance Underwriting 
Practices" furnished with the application documents. (R YoU, p. 211.) This document states 
that prior to issuing the policy 
"[T]he underwriter may first need additional information from you regarding your 
answers on the Health Statement. If so, we (or our representative) will contact you 
by telephone to obtain the information we need to make our decision. If we 
require a telephone interview and the interview is not completed for any reason 
we will not approve the insurance coverage(s) you requested." 
(R V 01.1, p.211. )(Emphasis added.) 
This is the only indication of the potential need for further information on the part of the 
insurer and it is specifically limited to the questions posed in the Health Statement and the 
answers given. (In this case Mrs. Shapley had answered all of the questions in the negative.) 
Importantly, the "Rights and Treatment of Debtors" section of the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act requires that in relation to offering credit life or disability insurance, "No 
statement made by a debtor shall be used by the insurer as a basis for denying eligibility for 
coverage unless such a statement is contained in a written application for insurance signed by the 
debtor." (IDAPA 18.01.61.11.14) Thus, the Defendants are limited to the written application, 
including the "Health Statement" to determine eligibility for this insurance. This makes sense 
because the insurer controls all aspects of the application process - timing, wording, and 
underwriting. This has been recognized by Idaho Courts. In Wardle v. International Health & 
Life Insurance Co., 97 Idaho 668, 551 P.2d 623 (1976) the Court observed that "[s]ince it frames 
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the application questions, the company must keep them free from misleading interpretations and 
the consequence of its failure to do so is that all ambiguities in the application will be construed 
against the insurer." Wardle, 97 Idaho 668, 672, 551 P.2d 623,627; Citing Purcell v. Washington 
Fidelity Nat'! Ins. Co., 141 Or. 98, 16 P.2d 639 (1932). See also Walston v. Monumental Lift Ins. 
Co., 129 Idaho 211, 923 P.2d 456 (1996) where a punitive damage award was supported in part 
by a rescission based on "unusual and strained" interpretation of the term "treatment." 
This also makes sense in the context of life insurance in general. The company is not 
without a remedy if the insured procures the insurance through misstatements in the application. 
Idaho Code §41-1811 specifically allows a company to rescind any policy obtained by an insured 
using an application containing "misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts, and 
incorrect statements" that are "fraudulent" or "material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to 
the hazard assumed by the insurer" or the insurer in good faith wouldn't have issued the policy as 
written ifit had known the truth.2 
In this case however, contrary to the required inception date of the policy and the 
requirements of the application process, after Mr. Shapley submitted a claim for Barbara's death, 
the Defendants ended their illegal underwriting inquiry and simply refused to issue the coverage 
promised. In considering this issue below, the District Court held that 
241-1811. Representations in applications. - All statements and descriptions in any application for an 
insurance policy or annuity contract, or in negotiations therefor, [sic] by or in behalf of the insured or 
annuitant, shall be deemed to be representations and not warranties. Misrepresentations, omissions, 
concealment of facts, and incorrect statements shall not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract unless 
either: 
(a) Fraudulent; or 
(b) Material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or 
( c) The insurer in good faith would either not have issued the policy or contract, or would not have 
issued it at the same premium rate, or would not have issued a policy or contract in as large an amount, or 
would not have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss, if the true facts had been 
made known to the insurer as required either by the application for the policy or contract or otherwise. 
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"It is this Court's conclusion that Centurion has not accepted the Shapley's 
applications at the time of Barbara Shapley's death. Centurion may very well have 
accepted Barbary Shapley's application after the telephone interview and not been 
in any violation of IDAPA 18.01.61.11.14. Or, Centurion could have learned of 
something during the telephone interview that caused it some concern, and it 
could have required another written application that it denied. However, neither of 
these scenarios did occur, and Centurion did not violate rules governing credit life 
insurance because Barbara Shapley died before Centurion could deny or accept 
the application." 
(R YoU, p.283.) 
2. The District Court's Interpretation of the applicable statute and 
regulation renders them meaningless and without effect 
When interpreting a statute, courts must strive to give force and effect to the legislature's 
intent in passing the statute. Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 336,870 P.2d 
1292, 1295 (1994). "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must 
give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." State v. Rhode, 
133 Idaho 459,462,988 P.2d 685,688 (1999). However, if the result is absurd, or if the language 
is ambiguous, the court must engage in statutory construction. Id.; Ada County Highway Dist. v. 
Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 368, 179 P.3d 323, 331 (2008). When engaging 
in statutory construction, courts have a "duty to ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect to 
that intent." Id. "[T]he Court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of 
applicable statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 336, 
870 P.2d at 1295 (internal citation omitted). "[The Court] also must take account of all other 
matters such as the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations and the policy behind the 
statute." Id. 
The District Court's interpretation ofI.C. § 41-2307 and the associated IDAPA governing 
credit insurance renders them totally meaningless and contrary to any possible intent of such 
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provisions. As interpreted in the Court's decision, the statute allows insureds to be unknowingly 
uninsured, companies to collect unearned premium, and for underwriting practices that only 
benefit insurers. As such, the interpretation of this provision leads to totally unjust and absurd 
results. 
i. This court should consider application of 'conditional receipt' 
or similar equitable doctrine given the statutory and 
regulatory restrictions on credit life insurance 
In many life insurance scenarios, the question of whether coverage was extended prior to 
an applicant's death is answered by application of the "conditional receipt" doctrine. This 
doctrine is predicated on the idea that an insurer may bind a kind of temporary coverage by 
acceptance of a premium that is conditioned upon actual acceptance later - after insurability has 
been determined. 
"There are two types of conditional receipts in common usage-the 'approval type' 
which usually recites that coverage shall be in force from a specified date 
provided the application is approved as applied for at the home office of the 
insurance company; and, the 'insurability type' receipt which provides that 
insurance coverage shall be effective as of a specified date provided the company 
is satisfied that on such date the applicant was an insurable risk under the 
company's underwriting rules for the policy applied for." 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 147-48,425 P.2d 346, 347 (1967). The 
imposition of coverage prior to actual acceptance of the risk has been fairly characterized as 
insuring the "uninsurable" for a short period of time but acceptable for public policy reasons. 
Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 149-50,425 P.2d 346, 348. 
Similarly, credit life policies being sold in Idaho ostensibly have an 'effective date' that 
often may predate the actual acceptance of the insurance. There is no justification in this context 
to apply a more liberal rule that would allow companies to shed the burden of indemnifYing an 
otherwise covered loss merely because of the company hasn't decided to "accept" the insured. 
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C. Material issues of fact exist whether a contract for credit insurance was 
formed 
"Formation of a contract is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve." 
Po. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237-38,159 P.3d 870, 
874-75 (2007); Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701, 702, 779 P.2d 15,16 (1989). 
"Formation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as evidenced by a 
manifestation of mutual intent to contract. This manifestation takes the form of an offer and 
acceptance." Id. Proof of a "meeting of the minds" requires evidence that the parties had a mutual 
understanding of the terms of their agreement and that they mutually assented to be bound by 
those terms. Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118 Idaho 353, 356, 796 P.2d 1026, 1029 (Ct. App. 1990). 
"The determination of whether there was sufficient evidence to show a meeting of the minds to 
form an express agreement is a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact." Id., citing 
Glenn v. Gotzinger, 106 Idaho 109,675 P.2d 824 (1984); BischojJv. Quong-Watkins Properties, 
113 Idaho 826, 748 P.2d 410 (Ct.App.1987). 
"To meet this standard the contract must embody a distinct understanding of the parties, 
showing a meeting of the minds as to all necessary terms of the contract." Dursteler v. Dursteler, 
108 Idaho 230, 234, 697 P.2d 1244, 1248 eCt. App. 1985), citing e.g., CH Leavell and Co. v. 
Grafe & Associates, Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 414 P.2d 873 (1966). "The obligations of the parties 
must be identified so that the adequacy of performance can be ascertained." Id., citing Dale's 
Service Co., v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 534 P.2d 1102 (1975). "If terms necessary to a contract are 
left for future negotiation, the contract cannot be enforced." Id., citing Brothers v. Arave, 67 
Idaho 171, 174 P.2d202 (1946). 
In this case there are disputed facts about whether the parties had such a meeting of the 
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minds regarding the issuance of the credit life insurance to Barbara Shapley. Irrespective of the 
Defendants' compliance with Idaho law, a jury could conclude, based on the available evidence 
that all parties understood insurance to cover the home loan would issue as long as Barbara met 
the applicable underwriting standards. It is undisputed that Bill and Barbara already promised to 
pay the premium as indicated in the "Insurance Disclosure and Application" and "Health 
Statement" and consistent with the Defendants' demands. (R Vol. 1 , pp 110-112.) The amount of 
insurance was established. (Id.) All material exclusions and limitations to payment of benefits 
had also been established between the parties. (Id. at 111.) Coupled with the admission under 
oath by the I.R.C.P. 30(b)(6) representative that the only basis for the denial was the lack of the 
phone interview, a reasonable jury could conclude that an agreement had been reached 
notwithstanding the failure of the Defendants to conduct the interview. 
The District Court below completely ignored the fact that Barbara Shapley met the 
underwriting guidelines for the insurance at issue and there were no material impediments to the 
enforcement of the contract. The lower court instead focused on the insurer's completely 
arbitrary and immaterial hurdle of obtaining a phone interview as some kind of condition 
precedent. A phone interview, remember, that was itself limited to the answers on a preprinted 
form already provided by the insured. A rational jury could conclude, based on all of the 
evidence, that the phone interview requirement itself a condition subsequent that could have still 
been effectively satisfied by requesting Barbara Shapley's medical records to confirm her 
answers to the "Health Statement." The statement itself authorized the Defendants to do so. (R. 
VoLl, pg. 112.) 
1. This Court should consider the doctrine of "temporary insurance" and 
the policy behind the decision in Toevs v. W. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. 
as instructive in this case 
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The dispute in Toevs v. W Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 151, 154,483 P.2d 682, 
685 (1971) centered on a term life policy - which did not involve the unique scenario of a credit 
policy issued by a company owned by the creditor. Id. at 152. In that case, the premiums were 
paid separately and were not part of any credit transaction. Id. However, the case is still insightful 
to understand that the company bears the risk of a loss occurring during its underwriting delay 
when an insured reasonably believes coverage exists following the application process. 
Judge Learned Hand in the case of [Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance 
Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2nd Cir. 1947)] held that a provision to the effect that the 
insurance shall be in effect from the date of the application if the premium is paid 
in advance gives rise to a contract of insurance immediately upon receipt of the 
application and payment of the premium and that the proviso that the company 
shall be satisfied that the insured was acceptable at the date of the application 
creates only a right to terminate the contract if the company becomes dissatisfied 
with the risk before a policy is issued. In that case Judge Hand stressed the fact 
that an application must be construed as it would be taken by the ordinary 
applicant and that such a person would assume that he was getting immediate 
insurance for his money and would not assume that he was left uncovered before 
the insurer approved the risk. 
Toevs v. W Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 151, 154,483 P.2d 682,685 (1971). 
The rationale behind Toevs and similar holdings is that it is the insured that bears all the 
risk when an insurance company can delay underwriting or accepting the application on its whim. 
The only "downside" of this process inures to the insured. 
In view of this finding, the unequal bargaining power of the two parties, the 
complex legalistic and ambiguous phrasing used throughout the contract, and the 
use by the insurance company of the procedure or device known as 'conditional 
premium receipt,' this Court holds that a contract of insurance was in existence on 
the date that the insured died. By this holding the Supreme Court of Idaho is 
subscribing to the theory known as 'temporary contract of insurance.' The 
conditional premium receipt created a temporary contract of insurance subject to a 
condition, i. e., rejection of Toevs' application by the insurance company. Since 
rejection did not occur prior to Toevs' death, the company is liable. 
Toevs, 94 Idaho 151, 155,483 P.2d 682, 686. 
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Here, it is undisputed that the proposed effective date for the Shapleys' credit life 
insurance was July 10,2008. (R. VoLl, pg 110.) This was in accordance with the statute 
requiring the policy to begin on the date the indebtedness begins. A jury could find that Mr. and 
Mrs. Shapley reasonably believed that their debt was protected from an untimely death on the 
date they closed on the loan as long as they met underwriting requirements. Indeed, Steve 
Ellison, agent and employee of the Defendants, told Mr. Shapley that the insurance was effective 
on the date the loan was signed. (R. Vol. 1 , pg. 172). The Shapleys were never advised that they 
were uninsured after closing on their loan. The Defendants provided paperwork that stated the 
company may need a telephone interview, but the necessity of the interview was never 
communicated to the insureds until after the claim was submitted. 
The underlying policy considerations of Toevs and I.C. § 41-113 in dealings between an 
insurer and insureds. As the lower court has interpreted § 41-2307, the statute would allow all 
credit life insurance applicants to be uninsured while in the repayment period of their loan. Such 
a result flies in the face of the intent of the regulations on credit life insurance and leads to absurd 
results. The purpose of this type of insurance is to protect the debt during the repayment period. 
The Plaintiff is not arguing that the company has to take all comers who may apply. However, if 
the company delays its underwriting until after the repayment period begins, it must bear the risk 
of a loss occurring during the period before the risk is accepted or rejected. 
Because the intent of the special credit insurance statutes are to require the term of the 
credit policy to begin at the closing of the loan summary judgment was inappropriate. Further, 
the Shapleys reasonably believed, as did Mr. Ellison, that coverage began on the closing date. As 
such, the Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its decision and deny summary judgment. 
2. The District Court's Decision impermissibly allows Defendants to collect 
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unearned premiums. 
The District Court's decision also allows the impermissible result of allowing insurers to 
repeatedly collect premiums for a period during which the companies are exposed to no risk. 
This is a prohibited practice in this state. Idaho Code § 41-1323 provides "(1) No person shall 
wilfully collect any sum as premium or charge for insurance, which insurance is not then 
provided .... " Irrespective of the statutes at issue, it is unconscionable for a company to indicate 
that coverage will begin on a certain day but then delay its underwriting and then either avoid the 
risk of a loss if one occurs, or otherwise collect premium during the self-imposed delay. 
[A]n insurance company might delay or backdate coverage as it sees fit-avoiding 
liability if a loss occurs soon after the application, or retaining the premium for a 
risk-free period if no such loss occurs. This practice has been vigorously 
condemned. 
Permann v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 108 Idaho 192, 195,697 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(Burnett, 1., dissenting)( citing Toevs v. Western Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co., 94 Idaho 151, 
483 P.2d 682 (1971)( emphasis added). 
The Court's interpretation of the code allows Centurion to do just what Justice Burnett 
said companies shouldn't do. It is undisputed in this case that had Barbara Shapley not passed 
away and Centurion satisfied its phone interview requirement, a policy would have been issued 
and paid for with an effective date of July 10, 2008. However, as the Court interpreted § 41-
2307, Centurion had no risk and only reward until it completed the phone interview. Had no loss 
occurred, Centurion would have collect unearned premium for the period in which it had no risk 
- the application date until the company completed underwriting. This is an absurd and unjust 
result which a trier of fact should have been allowed to consider as a basis for finding that a 
contract of insurance indeed existed in this case. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO 
AMEND HIS COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE THE EQUITABLE THEORY OF 
ESTOPPEL. 
Concurrent with his request for Reconsideration, Plaintiff also asked the lower court to 
allow him to amend his Complaint to include the equitable theory of estoppel to prevent 
Defendants from claiming that no contract had been formed. (R. Vol. 2, pg. 285-301) 
A. Estoppel is an appropriate remedy in this case as the Defendants should not be 
permitted to benefitfrom their change of position relative to Barbara Shapley's 
eligibility for insurance. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel in an insurance case requires an insured's reliance on a 
statement made by the defendant and the insurer must benefit from its change in position. Shoup 
v. Union Sec. Life Ins. Co., 142 Idaho 152, 155 (2005). Bill Shapley should have been allowed to 
advance his theory of estoppel on the facts of this case. There is no credible factual dispute in the 
record before the court that Barbara Shapley would have qualified for insurance in this case. 
Likewise, there is no dispute that under the Defendants' scheme of only ratifying insurance 
coverage if a loss has not occurred between the time of the application and whenever the 
company decides to accept the insured is clearly a benefit to the company. They not only avoid 
having to cancel the insured debt, they gain the interest owed over time by continued payments. 
1. Whether Plaintiff reasonably believed that a policy would be effective 
on the closing date is a question of fact for a jury. 
The question of whether the insured's reliance was reasonable in an estoppel scenario is a 
question of fact for the jury. Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 122, 126 (1995). 
It was inappropriate for the District Court to essentially decide that fact by denying the requested 
amendment. It is undisputed that the proposed effective date of the policy for both Barbara and 
Bill Shapley was July 10, 2008. No other underwriting requirement was discussed with the 
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Shapleys at that time. The need for a telephonic interview was mentioned in the paperwork, but it 
was mentioned as a possibility, not a requirement. It is also undisputed that the Defendants did 
nothing until after the claim was submitted to implement the phone call procedure. In addition, 
there are substantial facts that support the conclusion that nothing would be gained by demanding 
a phone call other than escaping liability for paying benefits associated with Barbara's death. 
Based on these facts, alone, a jury could find that the Plaintiff s reliance was reasonable. 
To further bolster the Plaintiffs reliance, the Plaintiff has offered testimony that Steve 
Ellison told him that the policy was effective when they closed on the loan. Mr. Ellison is a 
licensed agent for Centurion and a Wells Fargo employee. Clearly, he knows the guidelines and 
procedures the Defendants use in issuing these policies. Following Barbara Shapley's death, Mr. 
Shapley spoke with Mr. Ellison. Mr. Ellison said the policy was effective when the loan closed 
and he instructed Mr. Shapley to submit the claim for benefits. See Affidavit of William Shapley. 
If the Defendants' agent believed that the policy was effective on July 10, 2008, then it is 
also reasonable that the Plaintiff relied on that same fact. Therefore, Mr. Ellison's statement 
regarding the effective date of the policy reinforces the Plaintiffs reliance that the policy was 
effective when he and his wife became indebted. 
2. Quasi-estoppel applies in this case 
Unlike equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel does not require a misrepresentation by one 
party or actual reliance by the other. Keesee v. Fetzek, 111 Idaho 360, 362, 723 P.2d 904, 906 
(Ct.App.1986). 
To constitute quasi estoppel, the person against whom the estoppel is sought must 
have gained some advantage for himself, produced some disadvantage to the 
person seeking the estoppel, or induced such party to change his position. In 
addition it must be unconscionable to allow the person against whom the estoppel 
is sought to maintain a position which is inconsistent with the one in which he 
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accepted a benefit. 
Medical Servo Group, Inc. V. Boise Lodge No. 310, 126 Idaho 90,96,878 P.2d 789, 795 (Ct. 
App. 1994); Tommerup V. Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1,5,607 P.2d 1055, 1059 (1980), citing 
Bjornstadv. Perry, 92 Idaho 402, 443 P.2d 999 (1968). 
"Quasi estoppel is a broadly remedial doctrine, often applied ad hoc to specific fact 
patterns." Keesee V. Fetzek, 111 Idaho 360, 362, 723 P.2d 904,906 (Ct. App. 1986); See also, 
Med. Services Group, Inc, 126 Idaho 90, 96, 878 P.2d 789, 795. It "precludes a party from 
asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him." 
Keesee, 111 Idaho 360, 362, 723 P.2d 904, 906; citing KTVB, Inc. V. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 
281,486 P.2d 992, 994 (1971). The doctrine is designed to prevent a party from reaping an 
unconscionable advantage, or from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by 
changing positions. Id.; e.g., Dawson V. Mead, 98 Idaho 1, 557 P.2d 595 (1976); Lupis v. Peoples 
Mortgage Co., 107 Idaho 489,690 P.2d 944 (Ct.App. 1984). Quasi estoppel, unlike equitable 
estoppel, does not require misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by the other. Evans V. 
Idaho State Tax Commission, 97 Idaho 148,540 P.2d 810 (1975). 
Based on the facts in the record, the District Court below should have allowed Plaintiff to 
assert his claim for equitable relief. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
PLAINTIFFS THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE BASIS THAT NO 
CONTRACT EXISTED. 
The Court granted summary judgment on all claims because "all of Shapley's claims are 
predicated upon the existence of this purported contract." (R. Vol. 2, pg. 269) Defendants in this 
case had the burden of presenting evidence on each of the Plaintiffs claims to rule out any 
material issues of fact. "The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proving the 
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absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171, 
175, 923 P.2d 416 (1996). Whether a fact is "material" depends on whether it is "one upon which 
the outcome of the case may be different." Petersen v. Romine, 131 Idaho 537, 540, 960 P .2d 
1266 (1998). "Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the 
absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary 
matter is presented." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 771, 820 P.2d 360 (1991). Motions for 
summary judgment are to be decided upon facts shown, not upon facts that might have been 
shown. Aardema v. Us. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 793, 215 P.3d 505, 513 (2009) (citing 
Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335, 337, 689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct.App.l984). 
An insured can recover damages for negligence on the part of the party procuring the 
policy for errors in the issuance of the policy. See McAlvain v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 
777,554 P.2d 955 (1976). Issues of negligence present questions of fact to be resolved by the 
jury. Deshazer v. Tompkins, 89 Idaho 347, 355, 404 P.2d 604,608 (1965). 
Plaintiff adequately alleged that the Defendants were negligent in procuring or issuing the 
policy and delaying its issuance. That is separate and apart from the existence of the policy as the 
basis for the claim. Shapley's Complaint read in part: 
33. The Defendants had a duty to procure and issue insurance and pay benefits 
to Mr. Shapley for the policy that was in effect at the time of Barbara Shapley's 
death. 
34. Defendants negligently, grossly negligently and/or intentionally breached 
this duty by failing in their duty to properly and timely complete the underwriting 
of the Plaintiff's policy according to the standards of the insurance industry and 
the laws of the State of Idaho. 
(R. Vol.l, pg. 17). 
Furthermore, the agent for Wells Fargo Financial and Centurion, Steve Ellison, testified 
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that credit life insurance was discussed on the Shapleys' first visit to the branch. 
Q. Do you remember the first time you met Bill Shapley or his wife? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell me about it. 
A. They came into Wells Fargo Financial, spoke with Kyle first requesting a 
Loan, and Kyle directed them to me. He gave introductions. And the first 
question Bill asked was along the lines of, is there insurance on your 
loans? Or, can I get insurance? 
Q. That was the first question he asked you? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And what did you tell him? 
A. I said we have those options. 
Q. Do you remember giving him options? 
A. Yes. 
(R. Vol. 1, pg. 60-61) Despite this discussion of insurance on the first visit to the branch, Mr. 
Ellison did not have the Shapleys submit applications until the date of closing. It is undisputed 
that Mr. Ellison is a licensed agent to sell insurance on behalf of Centurion and was trained by 
the Defendants with respect to this type of insurance. There is no dispute that at all relevant times 
he was the Defendants' agent and employee. In light of the Defendants' underwriting procedures 
and the institutionally-created gap in coverage by requiring a phone interview in some cases, a 
jury could find that it was negligent for the Defendants to advise the Shapleys to submit their 
applications on the date they became obligated on the loan and not before. A reasonable jury 
could also find that the Defendants were negligent in the unreasonable delay in issuing coverage. 
These claims are totally independent of the existence of the insurance policy. Defendants 
presented no evidence to rule out the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. In 
fact, it presented no evidence with regard to the negligence claim. This is their burden to meet on 
summary judgment and they failed to do so. As a result, summary judgment on this claim was 
inappropriate and the Plaintiff requests reconsideration of the Court's decision. 
IV. BASED ON THE ERROR BELOW, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE 
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GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff asserts that a valid contract of insurance either existed at the time of Barbara 
Shapley's death or that the Defendants were negligent in failing to time the application process 
and associated underwriting to allow concurrent coverage with the loan. In addition, a jury 
should be allowed to consider Plaintiff's theory of estoppel as a basis for imposing contract 
liability on Defendants. Based on the forgoing arguments, the District Court's Order Granting 
Summary Judgment should be vacated in its entirety and the District Court's Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend to Conform to the Proof and to Include a Count for Equitable 
Estoppel should be rever, 
DATED this L day of September, 2012. 
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18.01.61 - CREDIT LIFE AND CREDIT DISABILITY INSURANCE 
000. LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
This rule chapter is promulgated pursuant to the rule making authority in Sections 41-211 and 41-2314, Idaho Code, 
to aid in the interpretation and implementation of Chapter 23, Title 41, Idaho Code, concerning credit life and credit 
disability insurance. Nothing in this rule chapter shall apply to insurance for which no identifiable charge is made to 
the debtor. (7-1-93) 
001. TITLE AND SCOPE. 
The purpose of this rule chapter is to protect the interests of debtors and the public in this state by providing a system 
of rate, policy form, and operating standards for the transaction of credit life and credit disability insurance. (7-1-93) 
002. WRITTEN INTERPRET A TIONS. 
In accordance with Section 67-5201(l9)(b)(iv), Idaho Code, this agency may have written statements that pertain to 
the interpretation of the rules of the chapter, or to the documentation of compliance with the rules of this chapter. 
These documents will be available for public inspection and copying at cost in the main office and each regional or 
district office of this agency. (5-8-09) 
003. ADMINISTRA TIVE APPEALS. 
All administrative appeals shall be governed by Chapter 2, Title 41, Idaho Code, the Idaho Administrative Procedure 
Act, Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code, and IDAPA 04.11.0 I, "Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the 
Attorney General," Subchapter A - General Provisions, Sections 000 through 099., (5-8-09) 
004. INCORPORA nON BY REFERENCE. 
No documents are incorporated by reference. (5-8-09) 
005. OFFICE -- OFFICE HOURS -- MAILING ADDRESS, STREET ADDRESS AND WEB SITE. 
01. Office Hours. The Department ofInsurance is open from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. except Saturday, Sunday 
and legal holidays. (5-8-09) 
02. Mailing Address. The department's mailing address is: Idaho Department of Insurance, P.O. Box 




Street Address. The principal place of business is 700 West State Street, 3rd Floor, Boise, Idaho 
(5-8-09) 
Web Site Address. The department's website is http://www.doj.idaho.gov. ( 5-8-09) 
006. PUBLIC RECORDS ACT COMPLIANCE. 
Any records associated with these rules are subject to the provisions ofthe Idaho Public Records Act, Chapter 3, Title 
9, Idaho Code. (5-8-09) 
007. -- 009. (RESERVED) 
010. DEFINITIONS. 
01. Closed-End Credit. "Closed-end credit" means a credit transaction that is not open-end credit. 
(7-1-93) 
02. Compensation. "Compensation" means money or anything else of value. (7-1-93) 
03. Credit Disability Insurance. "Credit disability insurance" means insurance on a debtor to provide 
indemnity for payments becoming due on a specific loan or other credit transaction while the debtor is disabled as 
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defined in the policy. (7-1-93) 
04. 
insurance. 
Credit Insurance. "Credit insurance" means both credit life insurance and credit disability 
(7-1-93) 
05. Credit Life Insurance. "Credit life insurance" means insurance on the life of a debtor pursuant to 
or in connection with a specific loan or other credit transaction. (7 -1-93) 
06. Credit Transaction. "Credit transaction" means any transaction by the terms of which the 
repayment of money loaned or loan commitment made, or payment for goods, services or properties sold or leased, is 
to be made at a future date or dates. (7-1-93) 
07. Creditor. "Creditor" means the lender of money or vendor of goods, services or property, rights or 
privileges, including a lessor under a lease intended as security for which payment is arranged through a credit 
transaction, or any successor to the right, title or interest of any such lender or vendor, and an affiliate, associate or 
subsidiary of any of them or any director, officer or employee of any of them or any other person in any way 
associated with any of them. (7-1-93) 
OS. Debtor. "Debtor" means a borrower of money or a purchaser or lessee of goods, services, property, 
rights or privileges for which payment is arranged through a credit transaction. (7 -1-93) 
09. Identifiable Charge. "Identifiable charge" is the amount the debtor is charged for insurance which 
is disclosed in the credit or other instrument furnished the debtor which sets out the financial elements of the credit 
transactions, and including any differential in finance, interest, service or other similar charge made to debtors who 
are in like circumstances, except for their insured or noninsured status. (7 -1-93) 
10. Indebtedness. "Indebtedness" means the total amount payable by a debtor to a creditor in 
connection with a loan or other credit transaction. (7-1-93) 
11. 
terminations. 
Net Written Premium. "Net written premium" means gross written premium minus refunds on 
(7-1-93) 
12. Open-End Credit. "Open-end credit" means an arrangement as defined in Section 28-41-301(25), 
Idaho Code, including revolving charge accounts, pursuant to which: (7-1-93) 
a. A creditor may permit a debtor, from time to time, to purchase on credit from the creditor or 
pursuant to a credit card, or to obtain loans from the creditor or pursuant to a credit card; (7 -1-93) 
b. The amounts financed and the finance and other appropriate charges are debited to an account; 
(7-1-93) 
c. The finance charge, ifmade, is computed on the account periodically; and (7-1-93) 
d. Either the debtor has the privilege of paying in full or in installments or the creditor periodically 
imposes charges computed on the account for delaying payment and permits the debtor to continue to purchase on 
credit. (7-1-93) 
13. Preexisting Condition. "Preexisting condition" means a health condition, including sickness or 
injury, for which there has been medical advice, diagnosis or treatment within six (6) months preceding the effective 
date of the debtor's coverage and which exists prior to the effective date of the coverage. (7-1-93) 
OIl. RIGHTS AND TREATMENT OF DEBTORS. 
01. Multiple Plans of Insurance. If a creditor makes available to the debtors more than one plan of 
credit life insurance or more than one plan of credit disability insurance, all debtors must be informed of all such 
plans for which they are eligible. (7 -1-93) 
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02. Substitution. When a creditor requires credit life insurance, credit disability insurance, or both, as 
additional security for an indebtedness, the debtor shall be given the option of furnishing the required amount of 
insurance through existing policies of insurance owned or controlled by the debtor or by procuring and furnishing the 
required coverage through any insurer authorized to transact insurance business in this state. If this subsection is 
applicable, the debtor shall be informed by the creditor of the right to provide alternative coverage before the 
transaction is completed. (7-1-93) 
03. Evidence of Coverage. (7-1-93) 
a. All credit insurance shall be evidenced by an individual policy, or, in the case of group insurance, 
by a certificate of insurance. The individual policy or certificate of insurance shall be delivered to the debtor in 
accordance with Section 41-2311, Idaho Code. (7-1-93) 
b. Each individual policy or certificate of insurance shall set forth such information as required by 
Section 41-2308, Idaho Code, and any other appropriate sections of the Idaho Insurance Code. (7 -1-93) 
04. Claims Processing. All credit insurance claims shall be processed in accordance with Sections 41-
1329 and 41-2312, Idaho Code. (7-1-93) 
05. Termination of Group Credit Insurance Policy. (7-1-93) 
a. If a debtor is covered by a group credit insurance policy providing for the payment of single 
premiums to the insurer, then provision shall be made by the insurer that in the event of termination of the policy for 
any reason, insurance coverage with respect to any debtor insured under such policy shall be continued for the entire 
period for which the single premium has been paid. (7 -1-93) 
b. If a debtor is covered by a group credit insurance policy providing for the payment of premiums to 
the insurer on a monthly outstanding balance basis, then the policy shall provide that, in the event of termination of 
such policy for whatever reason, tennination notice thereof shall be given to the insured debtor at least thirty (30) 
days prior to the effective date of termination except where replacement of the coverage by the same or another 
insurer in the same or greater amount takes place without lapse of coverage. The notice required in this paragraph 
shall be given by the insurer or, at the option of the insurer, by the crcditor. (7 -1-93) 
06. In terest on Premiums. I f any direct or indirect finance, carrying, credit or service charge is made 
to the debtor on such insurance charges or premiums, the creditor must remit and the insurer shall collect such 
premium within sixty (60) days after it is added to the indebtedness. (7-1-93) 
07. Renewal or Refinancing of the Indebtedness. Ifthe indebtedness is discharged due to renewal or 
refinancing prior to the scheduled maturity date, the insurance in force shall be tenninated before any new insurance 
may be issued in connection with the renewed or refinanced indebtedness. In all cases of such tennination prior to 
scheduled maturity, a refund shall be paid or credited to the debtor as provided in Section 017. In any renewal or 
refinancing ofthe indebtedness, the effective date ofthe coverage as respects any policy provision shall be deemed to 
be the first date on which the debtor became insured under the policy covering the indebtedness which was renewed 
or refinanced, at least to the extent of the amount and term ofthe indebtedness outstanding at the time of renewal and 
refinancing of the debt. In addition, the policy shall provide that, in the event the debtor becomes disabled while 
insured, credit disability insurance benefits will be payable during continued disability regardless of any termination 
of the insurance by renewal or refinancing, unless a different provision not less favorable to the debtor is approved by 
the director. (7-1-93) 
OS. Maximum Aggregate Provisions. A provision in a policy or certificate that sets a maximum limit 
on total payments must apply only to that policy or certificate except as may be provided for in Section 41-2005(4), 
Idaho Code. (7-1-93) 
09. Voluntary Prepayment of Indebtedness. If a debtor prepays the indebtedness other than as a 
result of death or through a lump sum disability payment: (7-1-93) 
a. Any credit life insurance covering such indebtedness shall be terminated and an appropriate refund 
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of the credit life insurance premium shall be paid to the debtor in accordance with Section 017; and (7-1-93) 
b. Any credit disability insurance covering such indebtedness shall be terminated and an appropriate 
refund of the credit disability insurance premium shall be paid to the debtor in accordance with Section 017. If a 
claim under such coverage is in progress at the time of prepayment, the amount of refund may be determined as if the 
prepayment did not occur until the payment of benefits tenninates. No refund need be paid during any period of 
disability for which credit disability benefits are payable. A refund shall be computed as if prepayment occurred at 
the end of the disability period. (7-1-93) 
10. Involuntary Prepayment of Indebtedness. If an indebtedness is prepaid by the proceeds of a 
credit life insurance policy covering the debtor or by a lump sum payment of a disability claim under a credit 
insurance policy covering the debtor, then it shall be the responsibility of the insurer to see that the following are paid 
to the insured debtor, if living, or the beneficiary, other than the creditor, named by the debtor or to the debtor's estate: 
(7-1-93) 
a. In the case of prepayment by the proceeds of a credit life insurance policy, or by the proceeds of a 
lump sum total and permanent disability benefit under credit life coverage, an appropriate refund of the credit 
disability insurance premium in accordance with Section 017; (7-1-93) 
b. In the case of prepaymcnt by a lump sum disability claim, an appropriate refund of the credit life 
insurance premium in accordance with Section 017; (7-1-93) 
c. In either case, the amount of the benefits in excess of the amount required to repay the indebtedness 
after crediting any unearned interest or finance charges. (7-1-93) 
11. Amounts to be Insured: (7-1-93) 
a. Credit life insurance benefits shall be consistent with the premium charge. Credit life insurance 
may provide benefits in amounts which do not exceed, but may be less than, the initial amount of indebtedness, 
including unearned interest or finance charges, or the actual amount of unpaid indebtedness, whichever is greater. 
(7-1-93) 
b. Credit disability insurance may provide benefits not exceeding an amount according to Section 41-
2306(2), Idaho Code. (7-1-93) 
c. If benefits to be provided are less than the scheduled amount of indebtedness, the insurer shall 
notify the insured of such benefit in the policy or certificate. (7-1-93) 
12. Total Disability. The policy shall not restrict coverage to those periods of total disability when the 
debtor is under the regular and continuing care of a physician, osteopath or chiropractor; provided, the insurer may 
retain the right to require medical evidence of actual total disability at reasonable intervals to justify the 
commencement and continued payment of benefits. (7-1-93) 
13. Permanent Disabilities. Credit disability insurance shall not restrict coverage to permanent 
disabilities, where the debtor is in fact totally disabled for the period required by the policy, although such disability 
may be of a temporary nature. (7-1-93) 
14. Statement by Debtor. No statement made by a debtor shall be used by the insurer as a basis for 
denying eligibility for coverage unless such statement is contained in a written application for insurance signed by the 
debtor. (7 -1-93) 
15. Acceptable Insurance Constituting Waiver. Acceptance of insurance by the insurer shall 
constitute a waiver of any conditions for issuance of insurance that the debtor's application revealed as breached on 
the date the application was made, unless a refund of all insurance charges to the debtor is actually made within thirty 
(30) days of the date the coverage became effective. (7-1-93) 
012. POLICY I<'ORMS AND RELATED MATERIAL. 
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01. Permissible Forms. Credit life and credit disability insurance shall be issued only in the forms 
described in Section 41-2305, Idaho Code. (7-1-93) 
02. Filing Requirements. All policy forms, certificates of insurance, notices of proposed insurance, 
applications for insurance, endorsements and riders to be delivered or issued for delivery in this state and the 
schedules of maximum premium rates pertaining thereto shall be filed with the director as required by Section 41-
2309, Idaho Code, and other applicable Department ofInsurance Bulletins and Rules. (7-1-93) 
013. DETERMINATION OF REASONABLENESS OF BENEFITS IN RELATION TO PREMIUM 
CHARGE. 
01. General Standard. Benefits provided by credit insurance policies must be reasonable in relation to 
the premium charged. This requirement is satisfied if the premium rate charged develops or is expected to develop a 
loss ratio of not less than fifty percent (50%). The Department of Insurance has established prima facie rates as a 
means to achieve the loss ratio benchmark. With the exception of deviations approved under Section 019, prima facie 
rates filed in accordance with Section 014 as adjusted pursuant to Section 018, shall be conclusively presumed to 
satisfy this general standard. Reporting forms throughout the period of coverage. (7 -1-93) 
02. Nonstandard Coverage. If any insurer files for approval of any fom1, providing coverage more 
restrictive than that described in Section 014, the insurer shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the director that the 
premium rates to be charged for such restricted coverage will develop or may reasonably be expected to develop a 
loss ratio not less than that contemplated for standard coverage at the premium rates described in these sections. 
(7-1-93) 
014. PRIMA FACIE RATES. 
01. Credit Life Insurance Prima Facie Rates. (7-1-93) 
a. Premium Rate. Premium rates for credit life insurance on a single life for the insured portion of an 
indebtedness repayable in equal monthly installments, where the insured portion of the indebtedness decreases 
unifonnly by the amount of the monthly installment paid, shall be as set forth in Subsections 014.01.a.i. and 
014.0I.a.ii. Subsection 014.0 l.a.iii. refers to single life premium rates for other types of benefits either alone or in 
combination with the type of benefits applicable to Subsections 014.0I.a.i. and 014.01.a.ii. (7-1-93) 
i. Eighty-six cents ($0.86) per month per one thousand dollars ($1,000) of outstanding insured 
indebtedness if premiums are payable on a monthly outstanding balance basis. (7-1-93) 
ii. Gross coverage - Decreasing term: fifty-four cents per one hundred dollars of initial insured 
indebtedness per year ($0.54/$1 ~O/year) if premiums are payable on a single premium basis and the amount of the 
insurance decreases in equal monthly amounts. (7-1-93) 
111. Level term: One Dollar per one hundred dollars of initial insured indebtedness per year ($11$100/ 
year) ifpremiums are payable on a single premium basis for an amount of insurance that remains constant throughout 
the period of coverage. (7 - I -93) 
iv. Joint coverage on either of the basis in Subsection 014.0 l.a.i., 014.0 l.a.ii., or 014.0 l.a.iii. shall be 
one hundred sixty five percent (165%) of the specified rate for that type of coverage. (7 -1-93) 
v. A combination of the appropriate rate for level term and the appropriate rate for decreasing term 
(with equal decrements), if coverage provided is a combination of level term and decreasing term (with equal 
decrements). (7 - I -93) 
Vl. If the benefits provided are other than those described in the introduction to this subsection, 
premium rates for such benefits shall be actuarially consistent with the rates provided in Subsections 014.0I.a.i., 
014.01.a.ii., 014.01.a.iii., and OI4.01.a.iv. (7-1-93) 
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vii. If the policy provisions are other than those that correspond to the use of rates provided for in this 
Rule chapter, those other provisions shall not be unfair, unjust, inequitable, misleading, or deceptive; encourage 
misrepresentation of the coverage; or be contrary to statute or administrative rule. (7 - I -93) 
02. Credit Disability Insurance Prima Facie Rates. (7-1-93) 
a. Premium Rate. Credit disability insurance premium rates for the insured portion of an indebtedness 
repayable in equal monthly installments, where the insured portion of the indebtedness decreases uniformly by the 
amount of the monthly installment payable, shall be as set forth in Subsection 014.02.a.ii and iii. Subsection 014.02.a. 
014.02.iii., 0 I 4.02.iv., and 0 14.02.v. refer to premium rates for other types of benefits either alone or in combination 
with the type of benefits applicable to Subsection 014.02.a.i. and 014.02.a.ii. (7-1-93) 
I. If premiums are payable on a single-premium basis for the duration of the coverage, the premium 
rates for one hundred dollars (S 100.00) of initial indebtedness repayable shall be as set forth in the following table 
utilizing straight line interpolation for the intervening months; or 
No. Months 
Indebtedness Is Non-Retroactive Benefits Retroactive Benefits 
Repayable 
14 Day - 30 Day 7 Day 14 Day 30 Day 
6 $1.00 $ .40 $2.60 $1.80 $1.30 
2 1.40 .80 3.00 2.20 1.70 
24 2.20 1.60 4.00 3.00 2.50 
36 3.00 2.40 5.00 3.80 3.30 
48 3.50 2.90 5.70 4.30 3.80 
60 3.90 3.30 6.30 4.70 4.20 
72 4.30 3.70 NA 5.10 4.60 
84 4.70 4.10 NA 5.50 5.00 
96 5.10 4.50 NA 5.90 5.40 
108 5.50 4.90 NA 6.30 5.80 
120 5.90 5.30 NA 6.70 6.20 
NA - Not Available 
(7-1-93) 
ii. Ifpremiums are paid on the basis of a premium rate per month per thousand of outstanding insured 
indebtedness, these premiums shall be computed according to the following formula or according to a fommla 





Where Sp = Single Premium Rate per one hundred dollars ($ I 00) of initial insured indebtedness repayable 
in n equal monthly installments. 
Op - Monthly Outstanding Balance Premium Rate per one thousand dollars ($1,000). 
n - Original repayment period, in months. (7-1-93) 
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Ill. The actuarial equivalent of Subsections 014.02.a.i. and 014.02.a.ii. shall be used if the coverage 
provided is a constant maximum indemnity for a given period of time. (7-1-93) 
iv. An appropriate combination of the premium rate for a constant maximum indemnity for a given 
period of time and the premium rate for a maximum indemnity which decreases in even amounts per month, if the 
coverage provided is a combination of a constant maximum indemnity for a given period of time after which the 
maximum indemnity begins to decrease in even amounts per month. (7-1-93) 
v. If the benefits provided are other than those described in Subsection 014.02.a.i. above, rates for 
such benefits shall be actuarially consistent with rates provided in Subsections 014.02.a.i., 014.02.a.ii., 014.02.a.iii., 
and 014.02.a.iv. (7-1-93) 
vi. The outstanding balance rate for credit disability insurance may be either a term-specified rate or 
may be a single composite term outstanding balance rate applicable to all loans. (7-1-93) 
vii. If the policy provisions are other than those that correspond to the use of rate provided for in this 
Rule chapter, those other provisions shall not be unfair, just, inequitable, misleading, or deceptive; encourage 
misrepresentations of the coverage; or be contrary to statute or administrative rule. (7-1-93) 
015. CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE. 
Premium rates in conformance with Section 014 shall apply to policies providing credit life insurance to be issued 
with or without evidence of insurability, to be offered to all debtors, and containing: (7-1-93) 
and 
01. Exclusions. No exclusions other than suicide within six (6) months of the incurred indebtedness; 
(7-1-93) 
02. Age Restrictions. Either no age restrictions or age restrictions making ineligible for coverage 
debtors sixty-five (65) or over at the time the indebtedness is incurred or debtors having attained age seventy (70) or 
over on the maturity date of the indebtedness. (7 -1-93) 
03. Open-End Credit Plan. Insurance written in connection with an open-end credit plan may exclude 
from the classes eligible for insurance, classes of debtors detennined by age, and provide for the cessation of 
insurance or reduction in the amount of insurance upon attainment of not less than age sixty-five (65). (7-1-93) 
04. Closed-End Credit Plans. On insurance written in connection with closed-end credit plans and 
open-end credit plans where the amount of insurance is based on or limited to the outstanding unpaid balance, no 
provision excluding or denying a claim for death resulting from a preexisting condition except for those conditions 
for which the insured debtor received medical advice, diagnosis or treatment within six (6) months preceding the 
effective date of coverage and which caused or substantially contributed to the death of the insured debtor within six 
(6) months following the effective date of coverage. The effective date of coverage for each part of the insurance 
attributable to a different advance or charge to the plan account is the date on which the advance or charge is posted to 
the plan account. Other more restrictive provisions may be used subject to appropriate rate adjustment approved by 
the director. (7 -1-93) 
05. Other Provisions. If the policy provisions are other than those that correspond to the use of rates 
provided for in Section 014, those other provisions shall not be unfair, unjust, inequitable, misleading, or deceptive; 
encourage misrepresentation of the coverage; or be contrary to statute or administrative rule. (7 -1-93) 
016. CREDIT DISABILITY INSURANCE. 
Premium rates in conformance with Section 014 shall apply to policies providing credit disability insurance to be 
issued with or without evidence of insurability, to be offered to all eligible debtors, and containing: (7-1-93) 
01. Preexisting Conditions. No provision excluding or denying a claim for disability resulting from 
preexisting conditions except for those conditions for which the insured debtor received medical advice, diagnosis or 
treatment within six (6) months preceding the effective date of the debtor's coverage and which caused loss within 
the six (6) months following the effective date of coverage. (7-1-93) 
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02. Other Exclusions or Restrictions. No other provision which excludes or restricts liability in the 
event of disability caused in a specific manner except that it may contain provisions excluding or restricting coverage 
in the event of normal pregnancy and intentionally self-inflicted injuries or disability arising out of the commission of 
felony acts. (7-1-93) 
03. Actively-at-Work Requirement. No actively-at-work requirement more restrictive than one (I) 
requiring that the debtor be actively at work at a full-time gainful occupation on the effective date of coverage. "Full 
time" means a regular work week of not less than thirty (30) hours. A debtor shall be deemed to be actively at work if 
absent from work due solely to regular day off, holiday or paid vacation. (7-1-93) 
04. Age Restrictions. No age restrictions, or only age restrictions making ineligible for coverage 
debtors sixty-five (65) or over at the time the indebtedness is incurred or debtors who will have attained age sixty-six 
(66) or over on the maturity date of the indebtedness. (7-1-93) 
05. Daily Benefit. A daily benefit equal in amount to one thirtieth (1/30) of the monthly benefit 
payable under the policy for the indebtedness. (7-1-93) 
06. Definition of Disability. A definition of "disability" which provides that during the first twelve 
(12) months of disability the insured shall be unable to perform the substantial and material duties of his occupation 
at the time the disability occurred, and thereafter the duties of any occupation for which the insured is reasonably 
fitted by education, training or experience. This Subsection 016.06 shall not apply to lump sum disability coverage. 
(7-1-93) 
07. Open-End Credit Plan. Insurance written in connection with an open-end credit plan may exclude 
from the classes eligible for insurance classes of debtors determined by age, and provide for the cessation of 
insurance or reduction in the amount of insurance upon attainment of not less than age sixty-five (65). (7-1-93) 
08. Other Provisions. If the policy provisions are other than those that correspond to the use of rates 
provided for in Section 014, those other provisions shall not be unfair, unjust, inequitable, misleading, or deceptive; 
encourage misrepresentation of the coverage; or be contrary to statute or administrative rule. (7 -1-93) 
09. Effective Date of Coverage. For the purposes of Subsections 016.01 and 016.03, the effective date 
of coverage for each part of the insurance attributable to a different advance or charge to an open-end credit plan 
account is the date on which the advance or charge is posted to the plan account. (7-1-93) 
017. REFUND FORMULAS. 
01. Filing and Approval by the Director. Any refund formula which is at least as favorable to the 
insured debtor as the "sum of the digits" formula, or the "Rule of 78," for single premium decreasing or disability 
plans or pro-rata for other plans, shall be deemed acceptable. Refund formulas must be filed with and approved by the 
director prior to use in accordance with Section 41-2310 (2), Idaho Code. (7 -1-93) 
02. Termination. In the event of tem1ination, no charge for credit insurance may be made for the first 
fifteen (15) days of a loan month and a full month may be charged for sixteen (16) days or more of a loan month. 
(7-1-93) 
03. Minimum Refund. No refund of five dollar ($5) or less need be made. (7-1-93) 
018. EXPERIENCE REPORTS AND ADJUSTMENT OF PRIMA FACIE RATES. 
01. Report of Credit Life and Credit Disability Business Written. Each insurer doing credit 
insurance business in this state shall annually file with the director and the NAIC Support and Services Office a report 
of credit life and credit disability business written on a calendar year basis. Such report shall utilize the Credit 
Insurance Supplement-Annual Statement Blank as approved by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners. Such filing shall be made in accordance with and no later than the due date in the Instructions to the 
Annual Statement. (7 -1-93) 
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02. Review of Loss Ratio Standards. Set Forth in Section 0 I 4. In 1995, and on a tricnnial basis 
thereafter, the director will review the loss ratio standards set forth in Section 013 and the prima facie rates set forth in 
Section 014 and determine therefrom the rate of expected claims on a statewide basis, compare such rate of expected 
claims with the rate of actual claims for the preceding three years determined from the incurred claims and earned 
premiums at prima facie rates reported in the Annual Statement Supplement, and may, if deemed necessary, revise the 
actual statewide prima facie rates by amendment of this Rule chapter to be used by insurers during the next three 
years. Such rates will reflect the difference between (a) actual claims based on experience; and (b) expected claims 
based on the loss ratio standards set forth in Section 013 applied to the prima facie rates set forth in Section 0 14. 
(7-1-93) 
019. USE OF RATES - DIRECT BUSINESS ONLY. 
01. Use of Prima Facie Rates. An insurer that files rates or has rates on file that are not in excess of 
the prima facie rates shown in Section 014, to the extent adjusted pursuant to Section 018, may use those rates 
without further proof of their reasonableness. (7 -1-93) 
02. Use of Rates Higher Than Prima Facie Rates. An insurer may file for approval of and use rates 
that are higher than the prima facie rates established pursuant to Section 018, to the extent adjusted, if it can be 
expected that the use of such higher rates will result in a ratio of claims incurred to premiums earned (assuming the 
use of such higher rates) that is not less than fifty percent (50%) for those accounts to which such higher rates apply 
and that such upward deviations will not result on a statewide basis for that insurer of a ratio of claims incurred to 
premiums earned of less than the expected loss ratio underlying the current prima facie rate developed or adjusted 
pursuant to Section 018. If rates higher than the prima facie rates shown in Section 0 I 4, to the extent adjusted 
pursuant to Section 018, are filed for approval, the filing shall specify the accounts to which such rates apply. Such 
rates may be: (7 -1-93) 
a. Applied uniformly to all accounts of the insurer; or (7 -1-93) 
b. Applied on an equitable basis approved by the director to only one (l) or more accounts of the 
insurer for which the experience has been less favorable than expected; or (7 -1-93) 
c. 
03. 
Applied according to a case-rating procedure on file with the director. 
Approval Period of Deviated Rates. 
(7-1-93) 
(7-1-93) 
a. A deviated rate will be in effect for a period of time not longer than the experience period used to 
establish such rate (i.e. one (I) year, two (2) years or three (3) years). An insurer may file for a new rate before the 
end ofa rate period, but not more often than once during any twelve-month (12) period. (7-1-93) 
b. Notwithstanding the provision of Subsection 019.01 of this rule chapter, if an account changes 
insurers, that rate approved to be used for the account by the prior insurer is the maximum rate that may be uscd by 
the succeeding insurer for the remainder of the rate approval period approved for the prior insurer or until a new rate 
is approved for use on such account, if sooner. (7 -1-93) 
04. Use of Rates Lower Than Filed Rates. An insurer may at any time use a rate for an account that is 
lower than its filed rate without prior notice, justification and approval by the director. (7 -1-93) 
05. Glossary of Terms and Definitions as Used in Section 019. (7-1-93) 
a. "Experience" means "earned premiums" and "incurred claims" during the experience period. 
(7-1-93) 
b. "Experience Period" means the most recent period of time for which experience is reported, but not 




"Incurred Claims" means total claims paid during the experience period, adjusted for the change in 
(7-1-93) 
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020. SUPERVISION OF CREDIT INSURANCE OPERATIONS. 
01. Responsibilities of Insurer. Each insurer transacting credit insurance in this state shall be 
responsible for the settlement, adjustment and payment of all claims and shall also be responsible for conducting a 
thorough periodic review of creditors with respect to their credit insurance business with such creditors, to assure 
compliance with the insurance laws of this state and the rules promulgated by the director. Such review shall include, 
but not be limited to, a verification of the accuracy of premium payments or other identifiable charges, premium 
refunds, and claims incUlTed. (7-1-93) 
02. Maintenance of Records. Records of such reviews shall be maintained for four (4) years for 
review by the director. (7- I -93) 
021. PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS. 
The following practices, when engaged in by insurers in connection with the sale or placement of credit insurance, or 
as an inducement thereto, shall constitute unfair methods of competition and shall be subject to the Unfair Trade 
Practices Act ofthis State as outlined in Chapter 13, Title 41, Idaho Code. (7-1-93) 
01. Special Advantages or Services. The offer or grant by an insurer to a creditor of any special 
advantage or any service not set out in either the group insurance contract or in the agency contract, other than the 
payment of producer commissions. (5-8-09) 
02. Deposit by Insurer of Money or Securities Required of Creditor. Agreement by an insurer to 
deposit with a bank or financial institution money or securities of the insurer with the design or intent that the same 
shall affect or take the place of a deposit of money or securities which otherwise would be required of the creditor by 
such bank or financial institution as a compensating balance or offsetting deposit for a loan or other advancement. 
(7-1-93) 
03. Deposit by an Insurer Without Interest or at a Lessor Rate of Interest. Deposit by an insurer of 
money or securities without interest or at a lesser rate of interest than is currently being paid by the creditor, bank or 
financial institution to other depositors of like amounts and terms. This paragraph shall not bc construed to prohibit 
the maintenance by an insurer of such demand deposits or premium deposit accounts as are reasonably necessary for 
use in the ordinary course of the insurer's business. (7-1-93) 
022. PRODUCER'S LICENSE REQUIRED. 
01. Life and Disability Insurance License or Limited License. To solicit credit life and credit 




Be licensed to sell life and disability insurance in complianee with Chapter 10, Title 41, Idaho 
(7-1-93) 
b. Be issued a "Limited License" as defined in Section 41-1003(4), Idaho Code, covering only credit 
life and credit disability insurance, and no individual so licensed shall during the same period hold a license as a 
producer as to any other or additional major line of insurance. (5-8-09) 
02. Individual, Firm or Corporation. Sections 41-1004, 41-1005, 41-1007, Idaho Code, provide that 
a limited producer'S limited license for credit life and credit disability insurance shall be issued to individuals, firms 
or corporations qualitying for such license. Any individual who sells, solicits or negotiates with debtors to purchase 
individual credit life or credit disability insurance, or who explains such coverage, must be licensed as an insurance 
producer. Any firm or corporation offering such individual coverage must comply with the provisions of Section 41-
1007(2) by having a designated licensed producer, who is an individual responsible for the business entity's 
compliance with the insurance laws and rules of this state. (5-8-09) 
03. Administration of Group Policy. Under Section 41-1 005(2)(b), Idaho Code, the issuance of group 
certificates of credit life insurance and credit disability insurance and the performance of other ministerial duties in 
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connection with group insurance policy administration does not require the person doing such acts to be licensed as a 
producer provided that no commission is paid for such services. A group policyholder may be reimbursed its cxpense 
of administering a group policy without being licensed as a producer, and such reimbursement will not be considered 
a commission provided it is reasonably computed to equate to the actual administrative expenses. It will be presumed 
that an amount of reimbursement not exceeding ten percent (10%) of the net written prima facie premium for the 
group policy is reasonably computed to equate to the administrative expenses of the group policyholder. Amounts 
exceeding ten percent (10%) of the net written prima facie premium will be presumed to exceed actual administrative 
expenses unless prior approval to pay such greater amount is secured pursuant to the insurer demonstrating to the 
director's satisfaction that such higher amount does not exceed the policyholder's actual administrative expenses. For 
purposes of this subsection, "prima facie premium" means premiums at the rates set forth in Section 014 without 
adjustment pursuant to Section 018. (5-8-09) 
04. Dividends and Other Compensation Permitted by Law. Subsections 022.01, 022.02, and 022.03 
do not apply to compensation that is otherwise permitted by law, such as the payment of dividends on participating 
policies. (7 -1-93) 
023. DISCLOSURE. 
When a premium or identifiable charge is payable by a debtor for credit insurance coverage offered by a creditor, at 
the time such insurance is applied for, disclosures shall be made to the principal debtor and copies given and retained, 
in accordance with State and Federal law. The creditor shall also disclose the optional nature of the coverage, 
premium or identifiable charge separately by type of coverage, eligibility requirements, and policy limitations and 
exclusions. These disclosures shall be made prominently above the space for the signature indicating election to 
obtain such coverage. These disclosures may be made in conjunction with either (I) the Federal Truth-in-Lending 
disclosure, (2) a Notice of Proposed Insurance, or (3) the insurance policy or certificate. (7 -1-93) 
024. SEVERABILITY. 
If any provision or clause of this rule chapter or the application thereof to any person or situation is held invalid, such 
invalidity shall not affect any other provision or application of the rule which can be givcn effect without the invalid 
provision or application, and to this end thc provisions of this rule chapter are declared severable. (7-1-93) 
025. REPEAL OF RULE NO. 19. 
This rule chapter superseded and repealed Rule No. 19 entitled "Credit Life and Disability Insurance," dated Octobcr 
1,1969. (7-1-93) 
026. -- 999. (RESERVED) 
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